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PROSECUTING ONLINE THREATS AFTER ELONIS
Michael Pierce*
INTRODUCTION
In Elonis v. United States,1 the Supreme Court failed to decide exactly
which mens rea standard the government must prove when it prosecutes an
individual for making an online threat under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).2 Three
standards were in play: specific intent, recklessness, and what was
characterized as either general intent or negligence. The Court’s majority
held that the last of these is precluded, but left lower courts to face a
seemingly broad decision between the two remaining options: whether to
require the government to prove defendants threatening individuals online
were reckless regarding their choice of words, or whether they specifically
intended their words be interpreted as threats.
Part I of this Essay discusses the holding in Elonis v. United States.
Part II presents the three potential mens rea standards for online threats and
shows how each standard either over- or under-protects some online
speech, and proves unsatisfactory as a one-size-fits-all solution. Part III
suggests that instead of deciding which standard is best for all online
threats, lower courts should adopt libel law’s distinction between public
and private targets,3 and similarly apply a heightened mens rea standard of
specific intent only when the speech at issue targets public figures.4
Distinguishing between threats against public and private figures, and
tailoring mens rea accordingly, is the best approach in light of core First
Amendment principles. A Facebook post containing violent language about
one’s elected representative implicates free speech values in a way that an
otherwise similarly threatening post targeting one’s ex-wife does not. It
will not always be easy, but drawing this distinction will allow courts to
achieve the best balance between freedom of speech values and the need to
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prevent intense psychological harm.
I.
ELONIS V. UNITED STATES
18 U.S.C. § 875(c), the statute at issue in Elonis, prohibits
“transmit[ting] in interstate . . . commerce any communication
containing . . . any threat to injure the person of another.”5 Anthony Elonis
was charged under this statute for threatening others online via several
violently worded Facebook posts referencing various individuals—his exwife, law enforcement officers, and schoolchildren.6 The court instructed
Elonis’s jury that the government must prove a reasonable listener would
have perceived his posts as a “serious expression of an intention to inflict
bodily injury or take the life of an individual.”7 The court rejected Elonis’s
request for an instruction that would have required the government to prove
Elonis specifically intended to threaten his targets.8 This denial allowed the
government to discount Elonis’s testimony during trial—during which he
claimed the posts were some mixture of art and therapy9—and argue in
closing “it doesn’t matter what [Elonis] thinks.”10 He was convicted on four
counts, and acquitted of one.11 On appeal, he argued the given instruction
was insufficient under both the statute and the First Amendment.12
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a seven-Justice majority, reversed
Elonis’s convictions, holding that the given jury instruction, which he
questionably characterized as requiring only negligence,13 was insufficient
to sustain a conviction under the statute. The Court declined to articulate
which mens rea standard was required, leaving an open question, both on
remand in Elonis’s case and more generally for all prosecutions of online
threats under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c): what mens rea standard applies to those
who threaten others online?
II.

MENS REA MATTERS: THREE UNSATISFACTORY UNIVERSAL
STANDARDS
There are three potential mens rea standards discussed in Elonis. First,
Elonis argued that the government must prove the speaker specifically
5

18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012) [http://perma.cc/CX27-AV8H].
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005–07 (providing details of the Facebook posts relating to Elonis’s
indictment).
7
Id. at 2007 (quoting jury instructions).
8
Id.
9
See id. at 2005–06.
10
Id. at 2007.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Chief Justice Roberts characterizes it as negligence-based because it uses a reasonable actor, like
traditional negligence determinations, id. at 2011, but the standard is only used to determine whether
the speech is a threat, not to determine anything with respect to the speaker’s actions (e.g., if they were
unreasonable). In other contexts (e.g., obscenity, fighting words) the standard is objective, yet survives
First Amendment scrutiny and is not characterized as merely negligence. See id. at 2027 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
6
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intended to threaten his target.14 Second, Justice Thomas adopted the
government’s position in his dissent, finding the trial court’s articulation of
a general intent standard satisfactory.15 Finally, Justice Alito, concurring in
the judgment, opined that the First Amendment requires the government to
prove Elonis was reckless as to whether his posts constituted threats.16 As
proposed universal standards for online threats, each standard leaves
something to be desired, showing the need for the hybrid standard
introduced in Part III.
All three standards elide a distinction between online threats directed
at public figures and those directed at private individuals. Searching for a
bright-line rule separating private from public figures is quixotic, but the
Court has endorsed the following distinction:
For the most part those who attain [the status of public figure]
have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of
society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and
influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes.
More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either
event, they invite attention and comment.17
The prominence obtained must be “especial”: someone cannot be a
public figure whose public profile is “much like those of countless
members of his profession.”18 The difference between public and private
figures affects the First Amendment calculus: the target’s identity can serve
as a useful proxy for whether the speech attacking him or her has broader
significance. This follows from the understanding that violent-sounding
words directed against a public figure, although expressed in threatening
language, may in fact communicate some inchoate political idea with
broader significance, a notion with which other people can agree or
disagree. (As will be discussed in Part II.C, libel law relies on this
distinction, imposing a heightened mens rea standard when the target of the
libel is a public figure.)
A. Specific Intent
The most defendant-friendly standard would require proof that the
speaker specifically intended to threaten his target. In its amicus brief, the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) explained: the Internet is the
quintessential public forum, and as a medium its speech is “often
14

See id. at 2012 (majority opinion) (stating Elonis opposed recklessness standard at oral
argument).
15
Id. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
16
Id. at 2015–16 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134 (1979) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 345 (1974) [http://perma.cc/KXL5-TUXX]) [http://perma.cc/3KZ2-UGTY].
18
Id. at 135.
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abbreviated, idiosyncratic, decontextualized, and ambiguous . . .
[subjecting it] to multiple interpretations,”19 therefore courts must “ensure
adequate breathing room” for “core political, artistic, and ideological
speech.”20
A specific intent requirement, however, would overprotect threats
directed at private targets, which have negligible First Amendment value.
The ACLU’s arguments are not terribly persuasive as applied to posts like
Elonis’s, which he asserts were either artistic or therapeutic;21 Justice Alito
is correct that a “fig leaf of artistic expression cannot convert such hurtful,
valueless threats into protected speech.”22 That Elonis targeted private
individuals against whom he had personal grudges23 means “[t]here is no
threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential
interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas; and the threat of liability
does not pose the risk of a reaction of self-censorship on matters of public
import.”24
B. General Intent
The government, and Justice Thomas, took the opposite position on
the proposed-mens-rea spectrum, arguing—as most Courts of Appeals
weighing in have25—that First Amendment concerns are sufficiently
addressed by the objective definition of “threat.” This definition, in the
view of these proponents, adequately protects the speaker from being
silenced by easily offended listeners.26 Thus, under the government’s
position, the instruction at issue in Elonis, whether characterized as
requiring proof of general intent or negligence, should have been

19

Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6,
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983), 2014 WL 4215752
[https://perma.cc/LY3N-7G6Q].
20
Id. at 5. See generally Paul T. Crane, Note, “True Threats” and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L.
REV. 1225 (2006) [http://perma.cc/CQ63-55VM]; Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the
First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 217 (discussing Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) [http://perma.cc/Y9UW-5YV5], and stating “both the Commonwealth of
Virginia and the Black majority (and, perhaps, the Black dissenters as well) believed that the First
Amendment imposed upon Virginia a requirement that the threatener have specifically intended to
intimidate”) [http://perma.cc/F6J8-9T2U].
21
See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005–06 (majority opinion).
22
Id. at 2017 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Obscenity law also embraces an
objective definition of art. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973) (holding work that
“appeals to the prurient interest, . . . describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct[,] . . . [and
that], taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” can be prohibited
consistent with the First Amendment (citations omitted)) [http://perma.cc/X2N8-SKG5].
23
Cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011) (noting “no pre-existing relationship or
conflict between [the speaker] and [the target of the speech] that might suggest [the speaker’s] speech
on public matters was intended to mask an attack on [the target] over a private matter”)
[http://perma.cc/Q4LG-PY5H]. The schoolchildren are an exception, as he had never met them, but his
threat did not carry any detectable political message.
24
Id. at 1215–16 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
25
Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
26
See id. at 2027–28 (discussing objective definition of “fighting words” and “obscenity”;
suggesting threats should be treated similarly) (citations omitted).
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permissible, especially in light of the extensive harm caused by online
threats.27 The damage to victims, including long-lasting psychological
harm, does not depend on the speaker’s state of mind.28 Online threats also
chill speech of both their targets and those who remain silent to avoid a
similar fate.29 In-person threats also chill speech of their targets, but the
public nature of many online threats suggests their chilling effect on thirdparty observers is likely stronger than their offline counterparts. More
broadly, of what value are posts reasonably conveying a serious expression
of an intention to inflict bodily injury or take the life of an individual? Note
that the government’s concerns apply equally to threats targeting private
and public figures.
This approach has considerable appeal, especially as applied to private
threats like Elonis’s. However, as a proposed universal standard that would
apply to threats against public figures, it is in serious tension with First
Amendment precedent, specifically the Court’s imposition of heightened
mens rea requirements for libel, both in civil and criminal contexts.30 Libel
too has an objective element, that of the truth or falsity of the statement,31
raising the question: why protect demonstrably false statements of fact that
injure the reputation of another? The Court has answered: ensuring no
chilling of protected speech requires “breathing space” for speakers,
created by precluding liability unless speakers were negligent (private
target) or reckless (public target) with respect to the risk of falsehood.32
But, as Justice Thomas points out, the Court has declined to accord this
mens rea buffer to speakers of fighting words or makers of obscenity, who
are protected only by those categories’ objective definitions.33 So, are
online threatening statements more like libelous ones, on the one hand, or
fighting words and obscenity, on the other?
Threats, libelous statements, and fighting words all have targets, and
obscenity does not. The identity of targets helps segregate statements into
categories more (and less) worthy of protection; because obscenity lacks

27

See generally Brief of the National Network to End Domestic Violence, et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 2–3, 10, Elonis v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983), 2014
WL 5013749 (describing harms to victims such as reducing “ability to sleep, eat, and work”)
[http://perma.cc/P76A-BPAE].
28
See id. at 2–3.
29
See, e.g., Catherine Buni & Soraya Chemaly, The Unsafety Net: How Social Media Turned
Against Women, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2014/10/the-unsafety-net-how-social-media-turned-against-women/381261 (describing deterrence and
chilling impact) [http://perma.cc/MFQ7-H5GT].
30
See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (extending to criminal prosecutions the New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) [http://perma.cc/AC6D-FCG9], rule requiring a false
statement about a public official be made with “actual malice” in order to grant civil damages)
[http://perma.cc/U4AQ-BV9X].
31
See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) (describing
California’s libel law) [http://perma.cc/B6R6-ESFE].
32
See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
33
See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2027–28 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

55

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

this feature, treating all of it the same makes sense. While online threats,
libelous statements, and fighting words all risk upsetting public order, the
key First Amendment distinction between these categories of speech is the
nature of the risk. In prosecuting fighting words, the government is
protecting the speaker: his words could get him beaten up.34 On the other
hand, in prosecuting libel and online threats, the government is protecting
the target.35
This difference matters, because the First Amendment protects
“vehement, caustic, and [] unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials”36 to a greater extent than those on private ones.37 In other
words, the Court has required public figures to endure harsher treatment
than private figures. Treating threatened public figures like public targets of
libel is consistent with First Amendment principles: both are subject to
(sometimes severe) psychological distress, yet the statements at issue are
sometimes indistinguishable from those truly worth protecting. With
libelous statements, the mens rea standard protects the possibility that the
libelous statement is true, though not provable. With threats, the standard
should protect expressions of outrage against a public figure, the public
figure’s actions, or the public figure’s ideology.38
Giving wide berth to these statements ensures consistency with the
Court’s goal “to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that
we do not stifle public debate.”39 Note that this analysis might not extend to
face-to-face threats, at least not to those made in private. (It doesn’t even
properly include all “online threats,” but only publicly viewable ones. Even
on social media there are private channels of communication: a threatening
Direct Message on Twitter, even one directed at a public figure, does not
merit protection even if an identically worded one in a publicly viewable
tweet would.40 Threats made through the latter avenues more closely
resemble face-to-face threats and similarly do not merit a heightened level
of protection.)
Public, online threats raise First Amendment issues. Therefore, even if
an objective definition adequately protects the speech of online bullies who

34

Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (fighting words, “when addressed to the ordinary
citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction [against the
speaker].”) [http://perma.cc/7UUS-2ZDU].
35
Cf. Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
283, 290–91 (2001) (listing four rationales for prosecuting threats).
36
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (emphasis added).
37
See infra notes 45 and 48 and accompanying text.
38
See infra Part III (describing threats as potential ideas in more detail).
39
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (emphasis added).
40
See, e.g., About Direct Messages, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/14606 (last
accessed August 2, 2015) (stating Twitter users can “use Direct Messages to have private conversations
with [other] Twitter users about Tweets and other content.”) [http://perma.cc/CFH3-CYQR]. A similar
dichotomy exists with in-person statements: compare someone encountering a Senator on a cul-de-sac
and threatening her with that same person yelling those same words at her at a populated rally for her
reelection.
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target private individuals, this standard (and its lack of a recklessness mens
rea requirement) underprotects the words of those openly attacking public
targets.
C. Recklessness
Between the defendant’s specific-intent and Justice Thomas’s generalintent standards, Justice Alito charts a middle course, advocating for a
recklessness requirement. He asserts that “recklessness regarding a risk of
serious harm is wrongful conduct,”41 and that this standard will not result in
wrongfully convicting someone for protected First Amendment
expression.42 In finding it provides “adequate breathing space” in the threat
context, Justice Alito invokes New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, yet elides its
crucial distinction43: the First Amendment requires public officials to
demonstrate a speaker’s recklessness before they can recover damages for
statements made “relating to [their] official conduct.”44 Ten years after New
York Times, the Court held that, with respect to statements made about
private individuals, the First Amendment imposed only a negligence
standard on libel suits.45
Justice Alito also relies on46 Garrison v. Louisiana, which extended
the reasoning of New York Times to criminal prosecutions,47 but that case’s
holding and reasoning, like in New York Times, depended on statements
targeting public figures. In Garrison, the Court rejected the lower court’s
conclusion that the defendant’s statement constituted “purely private
defamation,”48 suggesting, consistent with civil libel case law, that a lesser
standard would have applied had it been so. Justice Alito would collapse
this distinction as applied to online threats, suggesting the justification for
it no longer applies, or does not apply to online threats. But as this Part has
argued, and as Part III will further demonstrate, it does.
III.
A HYBRID APPROACH
Courts can more precisely balance the First Amendment interests of
the speaker against the need to protect the target from threats of harm by
using a two-part approach. This approach should focus on the identity of
the target and impose a higher mens rea standard when the target is a public
figure. This section will explain why this is a distinction with a difference,
albeit only from society’s—and not the target of the threat’s—perspective.
41

Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2015 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
42
See id. at 2016.
43
Id. at 2017 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)).
44
New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80.
45
Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
46
Elonis, 135 S.Ct. at 2015.
47
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
48
Id. at 76.
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The harm to the threat’s target is the same, but threats directed at public
figures more likely involve public issues, and as such deserve some First
Amendment protection, despite the serious harm to innocent victims threats
predictably cause.49
Angry online speech attacking public figures is more likely to convey
an idea on important public issues than that targeting private individuals;
thus, it is more deserving of First Amendment protection. The Court has
recognized that “speech concerning public affairs is more than selfexpression; it is the essence of self-government.”50 In the context of threats,
this means that there is a greater risk a “threat” against a public official is
not solely a “threat,” but also an entry into the marketplace of ideas (albeit
a frightening one). Someone writing something threatening about Barack
Obama online, especially if the two have never met, might very well be
expressing some rudimentary political opposition; someone threatening his
ex-wife is almost certainly not.51 The words of the threat are more worthy
of Constitutional protection in the first instance than in the second, and
using the identity of the target allows courts to distinguish between the two
without evaluating the content of the speech.
For better or worse, the First Amendment requires that public figures
withstand more severe verbal and written abuse than private individuals.
That speech targets a public figure is a sufficient but not necessary
condition for bestowing First Amendment protection on it. Even if the
target is a private one, if speech has even a faint political or ideological
bent to it, the First Amendment will shield it. For example, the funeral for
Marine Matthew Snyder became a target for the Westboro Baptist Church,
which stirred up publicity and then picketed his funeral (standing about 250
feet outside of it), singing hateful songs throughout.52 The Court, while
acknowledging that Westboro’s speech “is certainly hurtful and its
contribution to public discourse may be negligible,” found that it
“addressed matters of public import” and did so “on public property [and]
in a peaceful manner.”53 Therefore, despite testimony that the speech
caused Snyder’s father Albert “emotional anguish [that] had resulted in
severe depression and had exacerbated pre-existing health conditions,” the
speech was fully protected by the First Amendment, precluding even civil
liability.54
Threats, like libel, are exceptions to the First Amendment’s

49

Cf. supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text (describing harm from online threats).
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74–75.
51
Cf. Kyle A. Mabe, Note, Long Live the King: United States v. Bagdasarian and the SubjectiveIntent Standard for Presidential “True Threat” Jurisprudence, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 51, 57–58
(2013) (advocating specific intent requirement for threats against the President or presidential
candidates for this and other reasons) [http://perma.cc/F7NC-WXLK].
52
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011).
53
Id. at 1220.
54
Id. at 1214, 1220.
50
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prohibition on content-based restrictions,55 so they need not be protected in
an absolute manner like the nonthreatening and nonlibelous opinion
statements of the Westboro Baptist Church. Yet the same rationale that
moved the Court to protect hate speech in that case, the fear of “stifl[ing]
public debate,”56 even when the “debate” at issue is a one-sided screed,
suggests caution when prosecuting online threats. Remaining true to the
First Amendment’s animating principle requires mens rea protection for
speakers of online threats against public officials.
CONCLUSION
Since Elonis held general intent insufficient for online threat
prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), lower courts are left with two mens
rea options. Federal courts need not decide whether Justice Alito’s
recklessness standard or the more protective specific intent requirement
strikes a better balance for all online threats; each court should focus on the
precise threat before it and, guided by libel case law, decide whether the
target is a private individual or a public figure. After making this
determination, courts should instruct juries on recklessness when the threat
is to a private individual, and on specific intent when the defendant has
targeted a public figure.
That is not to say the Court in Elonis got it right; in fact, I think it did
not. Elonis targeted private individuals, and did not appear to raise any
issues of “public import” with his threats that would make them at all
analogous to the Westboro Baptist Church’s funeral-protest speech. As
such, the analogy to libel law would suggest an affirmance of his
conviction: the objective-listener requirement, coupled with general intent
negligence, adequately protects the limited First Amendment values at
stake in his posts. His threats against his ex-wife, among others, are no
more valuable than demonstrably false statements of fact harming the
reputation of a private individual: they both cause serious harm and do not
add anything appreciable to the public marketplace of ideas, so a
negligence-type standard should be acceptable. Following from this, online
threats against public figures or threats that implicate broader public issues
should require the Government to prove recklessness on the part of the
speaker.57
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